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The European Union is a polity-in-the-making where political actors contend 
about basic questions of governance. While students have begun to map 
contention among public, parties and private interests, little attention has been 
paid to how office-holders in the Commission conceive of European 
integration. Using interview data collected from 140 senior Commission 
officials, I identify contention along four dimensions: whether the EU should 
have supranational or intergovernmental institutions, democratic or 
technocratic decision making, promote regulated capitalism or market 
liberalism, and whether the elite should defend the European public good or be 
responsive to various interests. My findings challenge EU theories that 





















































































































































































What conception of Europe do top administrators in the European Commission 
entertain?* Most studies of the Commission, the executive-administrative body 
of the European Union, focus on the college of Commissioners, that is, the 
twenty high-profile politicians appointed for five years by national 
governments and European Parliament to give direction to the Commission.1 
This study examines the political beliefs of the elite permanent officials, the 
Commission’s 200 top career civil servants of A1 or A2 grade. I use data 1 
collected between July 1995 and May 1997 from extensive interviews with 140 
of them, and mail questionnaires from 106.2 In conjunction with the political 
College, they have a constitutional obligation to play a political role in the 
European Union, most prominently because they have exclusive competence to 
initiate and draft legislation. These directors-general, directors and senior 
advisors provide leadership to 4,000 Commission administrators; they direct 
negotiations between the Commission on the one hand and Council working 
groups, the European Parliament and interest groups on the other; they promote 
the policies of their directorate in relation to private interests, politicians and 
public; they report directly to the political Commission.3
In the first section of this article I synthesize Commission officials’ 
beliefs on European governance along four dimensions. In the following 
section I examine the distribution of all orientations on these dimensions and I 
complement quantifiable data with a focused interpretative reading of the 
interviews to develop a typology of “images of Europe” held by senior 
Commission officials. My basic argument is that top Commission officials hold 
articulate - but contending - views about the future of the European Union. This 
goes against the grain of European integration studies that conceive of the 
Commission as a unitary actor with a pro-integration agenda. Divergent views 
about Europe’s future among leaders of the European Union’s high-profile 
supranational institution also question the boundedness of the Commission, that 
is, its capacity to shape its officials’ beliefs.
DIMENSIONS OF CONTENTION
National politics are conducted within the parameters of historic settlements 
about basic questions of governance. These have to do with how authority 
should be organized, the scope of authoritative regulation in the economy, and 
the role of societal interests in government. While such national institutional 
settlements may be conditional or implicit, they are usually tangible enough to 
shape political activity and policy choices in fairly predictable ways. The 
European Union, however, is a young polity where political actors have only 



























































































officials, as professional players in the European arena, conceive of European 
governance?
My survey taps the following four features of governance in the 
European Union:
• Locus of authority (European institutions or member states): a supranational 
or intergovernmental Europe?
• Principles of authoritative decision-making: a democratic or technocratic 
Europe?
• Politics and market: European regulated capitalism or a free-market Europe?
• Public interest and societal input: a Europe with an elite speaking for the 
general European interest or a Europe with elites responsive to contending 
interests?
I examine these features with the help of an exploratory factor analysis on 
responses by 106 officials. Factor analysis assesses the degree to which 
particular items tap the same concept. If officials respond in similar ways to 
two questions, then these issues are seen as being conceptually related. 
Appendix 1 lists 17 items pertaining to various aspects of these four proposed 
dimensions. Respondents indicated whether they agree without reservations (4), 
agree with reservations (3), disagree with reservations (2), or disagree without 
reservations (1). I deliberately omitted a neutral point, and as a result only a 
very small number of respondents (on average 2.5 percent, and for one item 
4.7%) insisted on neutrality or abstained; I allocate them a value of 2.5.5 To 
minimize the risk of acquiescent responses, these items were randomly 
distributed among a total of 32 items, which also contained questions on 
internal coordination in the Commission and profiles of bureaucratic behavior.
U The first dimension concerns the locus of authority in the European 
Union. The accumulation of authoritative competencies at EU level has eroded 
national sovereignty and disturbed the allocation of authority across levels of 
government in national states.6 This development has provoked contention 
about the appropriate locus of authority. Should it be vested in the member 
states and the Council of Ministers, or should supranational institutions like the 
European Commission and European Parliament be strengthened? In the 
language of students of European integration, should the European Union be 
governed primarily in intergovernmental or supranational fashion?7 This echoes 
center-periphery tensions that shaped territorial politics in many national 




























































































Of the seventeen items on the questionnaire, four speak directly to 
contention concerning the locus of authoritative control (appendix). Item 1 asks 
whether ultimate authority should rest with the member states or with Europe; 
item 2 broaches the issue of subsidiarity, arguing that the strength of Europe 
lies in effective government at the lowest possible level. Items 3 and 4 postulate 
that the Commission should be the true government of the European Union, and 
that it should act less as an administration and more as the government of 
Europe.
1 Structuring authority in Europe is not only a matter of privileging an 
institutional architecture over another. It also involves a basic choice between 
decision-making principles: should the European Union be democratic, like its 
member states, or technocratic, like other international organizations for 
economic cooperation? The deepening of European integration has led to a 
politicization of EU decision making. The roots of this development go back to 
the mid-1960s, when Jean Monnet’s method of piece-meal problem solving 
through technocratic bargaining was thwarted by French president Charles de 
Gaulle. From then on, European decision making has alternated between 
technocracy and principled political conflict about the general premises of 
European integration. Until the mid-1980s, decision making was predominantly 
confined to elites, but it has since been opened to a variety of interest groups 
and, increasingly, wide-ranging, public debate.9 As actors whose influence 
largely depends on expertise, top Commission officials have a direct stake in 
the technocratic/democratic debate.
Several items touch upon officials’ orientations on this issue. Item 5 
invokes a technocratic Europe, with the Commission cast in the role of efficient 
administrator. Item 6, which states that the Commission should concentrate on 
maintaining the internal market, also taps this belief. Item 7 provides a litmus 
test for “democrats”. It raises the question whether the European Union should 
become a normal representative democracy, where, in analogy with national 
political systems, the European Parliament has full legislative powers, even if 
this might cost the Commission its exclusive right to propose legislation. The 
Commission’s monopoly of initiative has been the bedrock of Monnet’s 
decision mode of elitist, expert-based problem solving. A top official willing to 
give up this unique power in exchange for parliamentary powers 
unambiguously favors a democratic Europe.
The third dimension refers to relations between politics and market. To 
what extent should market activity be regulated at the European level, and to 
what extent -  if at all - should the European Union redistribute from rich to 




























































































has deepened, the traditional left/right struggle has spread from national politics 
to the European arena -  though recast in a somewhat more market-friendly 
language.10 Political actors in the European Union have different projects for 
capitalism in Europe. At one end of the ideological spectrum stand European 
market-liberals. They seek to insulate the European-wide market from political 
interference by combining European market integration with minimal European 
regulation. This grouping brings together neoliberals who want minimal 
political interference at whatever level and nationalists intent on sustaining 
state sovereignty. Opposing them are proponents of European regulated 
capitalism, who want legislation at the European level to create something akin 
to social democracy. How does this fundamental cleavage structure the 
orientations of top Commission officials?
Six items of Appendix I are directly relevant to the dimension political 
regulation/market liberalism. The bottom line is whether “Europe should be 
more than a common market” (item 8). This sets the stage for more targeted 
probing of officials’ mindsets: do Commission officials wish to regulate the 
common market in social-democratic direction or do they prefer economic 
liberalization? These contrasting ideological choices are represented by item 9 
(unique model of society), which summarizes former Commission president 
Jacques Delors’ definition of European regulated capitalism, and item 6, which 
suggests that the Commission should restrict itself to policing the internal 
market. Items 10 and 11 ask Commission officials to contemplate the 
consequences of ideological choices for policy making. What is their stance on 
the bedrock of the anti-neoliberal program - cohesion policy, which aims to 
reduce regional inequalities in the European Union through structural 
programming and currently absorbs 35 per cent of the EU budget (item 10)? 
And how do they evaluate the influence of (neo)liberal stakeholders - big 
business - on European policy (item 11)? Given that European regulated 
capitalism requires strong central authority in a wide range of policy areas, 
while market liberalism calls for European presence in selected areas like 
competition policy only, proponents of European regulated capitalism should 
be in favor of a strong, autonomous Commission. They should want the 
Commission to have a clearly articulated strategy or blueprint for the future 
(item 12). They may in addition support more powers for the European 
Parliament (item 7), as the latter has been an ardent supporter of key policies of 
European regulated capitalism, including regional policy, environment, social 
policy, and R&D.
Finally, which conception of the public interest should senior 
Commission officials represent? Should they embody a higher European 
interest or should they be the agents of stakeholders in European policies - 




























































































increasingly, the public? Should the Commission insulate itself from 
contending interests or should it be responsive? The relationship between civil 
servants and their interlocutors is a defining feature of each civil service. 
French fonctionnaires tend to take a detached, slightly superior attitude towards 
“particularistic” interests.11 British civil servants are inclined to consult but like 
to have the last word. German Beamten administer through dense, stable 
networks with organized interests. American bureaucrats work hard to nurture 
relationships as stakeholder support largely determines policy success.1"
Like national civil servants, Eî opeaa officials define their relationship 
with those who claim a stake in EU public policies. But as employees of an 
organization at the nexus of the national/ international boundary, they are, like 
their counterparts in international organizations, more vulnerable towards 
stakeholders than national officials. They have a harder time justifying what 
their “added value” is. National civil servants can credibly claim to speak for 
the public interest, that intangible though influential notion of the public good 
(especially in Europe). International civil servants, however, are likely to be 
asked to specify which public and which interest they defend. Furthermore, 
officials in international organizations face powerful alternative loci of 
authority in the form of national governments. National communities may 
ultimately be imagined13, but a diversity of experiences reinforce their imagined 
boundaries: national anthems, welfare services, legal systems, constitutions, 
local government structures, memberships in the United Nations and the EU 
Council of Ministers. International communities are invented as well, but the 
notion of international public interest has a shallower base in reality. 
International officials perceive a tension between being responsive to the actual 
world of national actors and representing the abstract realm of the international 
community.14 How do Commission officials relate to their interlocutors-interest 
groups and national governments? Does a “European interest” transcend 
particular interests, or does it emerge out of close collaboration with such 
interests?
Items 13 and 14 measure the officials’ stance towards particularistic 
interests. Do private interests, including trade unions, farmer organizations, 
industry, environmental lobbyists, disturb the proper functioning of European 
government? Do egoistic member state interests threaten the European project? 
Officials who conceive a distinct European public interest should be worried 
about the preponderant influence of particularistic interests on the Commission. 
The most cited threat to Commission autonomy is capture by national interests, 
which is measured in item 16 (for individual officials) and 17 (for 
administrative services in the Commission). Officials may also be vulnerable to 
industrial interests, first and foremost corporate interests (“big business”) (item 




























































































positive towards particular interests -  national or sectoral. This view is stated in 
item 15, which argues that the best advice usually comes from affected 
interests.
The results I report here are based on the principal component method 
and varimax rotation, though the results are robust across alternative 
methodological choices.15 Factor analysis substantiates that top Commission 
officials’ orientations on European governance can be validly conceptualized 
along these four dimensions.16 The results in Table I include all factor loadings 
of .30 or higher. The four factors explain a rather high 47.4 percent of the 







































































































Too often nationality interferes in official’s judgment (16) .77
Certain DGs are dominated by nationalities and this hurts 
the Commission’s legitimacy (17)
.68
Special interests disturb the proper working of European 
government (13)
.63
Commission is too much administration, not enough the 
government of Europe (4)
.55 -.49
Some egoistic member states threaten European project 
(14)
.39 -.37
No united Europe without mature EU cohesion policy 
(10)
.77
Commission needs vision, blueprint for future (12) .65
Commission should preserve unique model of European 
society (9)
.62
Europe should be more than a common market (8) .55 -.37
Commission should concentrate on maintaining internal 
market (6)
.73
Commission should concentrate on administering 
efficiently (5)
.70
Member states should remain central pillars of EU (1) .51 .47
Commission should support full legislative powers for 
European Parliament (7)
.35 -.43
Best advice usually comes from interests directly affected 
(15)
.41
Subsidiarity- more power at lowest level, not for Brussels 
(2)
.72
Commission should become true government of the 
European Union (3)
.31 -.59
Too much influence of big business (11) .32 .34 .44
Eigenvalues 2.23 2.18 1.92 1.72
Variance explained 13.1 12.8 11.3 10.1
Factor I: Public Interest and Societal Input: Eurofonclionnaires versus Responsive- 
Euroservants
Factor II: Politics and Markets: Political-Regulators versus Market-Liberals
Factor ID: Principles of Decision Making: Technocrats versus Democrats




























































































The first factor refers to whether Commission officials should speak for the 
general European interest or be responsive to the interests of major 
stakeholders - national and sectoral or functional interests. Five statements load 
strongly on this factor, which explains 13.1 percent of the variance. The most 
remarkable finding is that officials who fear control by national interests tend to 
be apprehensive about special (that is, sectoral or functional) interests as well. 
The relatively high loading for the last item - too much influence of big 
business - underlines that officials do not make a conceptual distinction 
between public and private stakeholders. What matters are contending beliefs 
about how to deal with the outside world, not officials’ particular stance on 
national or industrial capture. Commission officials make a distinction between 
nationality as one source of influence on European policy making, and member 
states as the constituent units of the European constitutional structure. This 
dimension taps divergent views on the former, while the supranational/ 
intergovernmental dimension (fourth factor) synthesizes contention on the 
latter.
Factor II is the politics/market dimension, juxtaposing those who favor a 
more egalitarian, social-democratic European Union against those supporting a 
free trade area (or common market). This factor is most powerfully determined 
by officials’ stance on EU cohesion policy, the flagship for proponents of 
European regulated capitalism. Interestingly, the internal market item fails to 
load strongly, suggesting that the internal market program is not a major bone 
of contention between market-liberals and those who favor a social dimension 
in European integration. As we will see, Commission officials associate this 
item with a different kind of choice about Europe: whether Europe should be 
technocratic or democratic. These results support the argument that left-wing 
views go hand in hand with greater enthusiasm for political integration. 
Proponents of a social-democratic European Union want a more strategic 
political Commission (item 12) and they support more powers for the European 
Parliament (item 7). This factor explains 12.8 percent of total variance.
The third factor expresses contention about whether Europe should be 
governed according technocratic or democratic principles. Five items score 
high on this factor, which explains 11.3 percent of the variance. “The 
Commission should concentrate on maintaining the internal market” (item 6) is 
the leading item on this factor, closely followed by the item stating that “the 
Commission should concentrate on administering things efficiently” (item 5). 
Top Commission officials believe that one has to make a trade off between 
policy efficiency and democracy. Those who give priority to the internal market 
and to efficient management want technocratic decision making. Their trusted 




























































































item 14) and from directly affected interests (item 15). They distrust elected 
politicians in the European parliament (item 7).
Factor IV captures the traditional conception of European integration as 
an ongoing debate about contending institutional futures for the European 
Union-an intergovernmental Union where authority is vested in its constituent 
units, or a federal-type structure where the supranational center has significant 
autonomous authority. Items on subsidiarity (item 2) and on member states as 
central pillars (item 1) on the one hand and on the Commission as the true 
government (item 3) on the other hand have very high scores, and they carry 
diametrically opposite signs. Not surprisingly, item 4 (Commission acts too 
much as an administration, not enough as government of Europe) and item 8 
(Europe should be more than a common market) also have a high negative 
score. Proponents of intergovemmentalism believe that big business has too 
much influence on European policy making. The fact that this item (11) scores 
highest on this dimension corroborates neofunctionalist theories, which have 
conceived of transnational business as key supporters of deeper European 
integration.17 Factor IV explains 10.1 percent of the variance.18
Factor analysis is useful in discovering the structure underlying political 
beliefs. It helps one to make sense of a complex social reality by identifying 
underlying patterns. But it does so at a cost. It does not tell anything about the 
Commission officials’ stances within each dimension. To examine substantive 
variation in the views of Commission officials one needs to disaggregate the 
four dimensions into the individual items that constitute them. Are most 
officials supranationalist and Euro-socialist - as is often claimed in public 
discourse? To what extent are they technocratic? How many feel strongly about 
defending a European public interest?
IMAGES OF EUROPE
These four dimensions are not purely artifacts of quantitative analysis. They tap 
into coherent images of Europe, which are very clearly articulated by 
Commission officials themselves. I use two methodologies to explicate more 
systematically the various ideal Europes of top Commission officials. One way 
is to construct scales for each dimension.19 Table II reports various statistics 
including minimum and maximum values, quartile values, mean, standard 
deviation and skewness of the distribution. The other approach is to develop 
Weberian ideal-types, expressing each of the four dimensions, that are based 
very directly on the conscious understanding that Commission officials 
themselves have about their political world. For the latter, I draw from the 




























































































Table n - 
(quartiles)
Images of Europe : Distribution of Commission Officials on Four Dimensions
N=105 Allocation of Principles of Politics and Public Interest and
Authority Decision making Market Societal Input
Intergovemment Technocrats Eurofonctionnaires
alists V S Political- V S
V S Democrats Regulators Responsive-
Supranationalists V S Euroservants
Market-Liberals
Max. Value 3.80 3.40 4.00 3.25
75 % 2.80 2.60 4.00 2.50
50% 2.40 2.40 3.33 2.25
25% 2.20 2.00 3.00 1.75
Min. Value 1.20 1.20 2.00 1.00
Mean1 2.43 2.35 3.37 2.15
St.Dev .502 .439 .554 .589
Skewness -.229 -.176 -.671 .105
a Values range between 1-4
Allocation of Authority: Supranationalists versus Intergovernmentalists
Senior Commission officials rule out a Europe of sovereign nation-states. The 
following response is as far as “Euro-skeptical” officials go: “The problem is to 
find an efficient institutional construct - I am not only thinking of economic 
efficiency, but also of political efficacy. We know very well that, politically, we 
need to go beyond the nation-state.” (Official 027.) Senior Commission 
officials wish to create a common structure of authoritative decision making in 
Europe-no interviewee goes beyond intergovemmentalism to assuage Euro- 
skeptical nationalism. However, they are divided on where the main locus of 
authoritative decision making should lie - with the Council (intergovernmental) 
or the Commission (supranational) - and to what extent competencies should be 
pooled - minimally (intergovernmental) or more extensively (supranational).
As a group, Commission officials are lightly bent to the supranational 
pole: mean and median dip just below the neutral value 2.5. However, 25 
percent of the interviewees prefer intergovemmentalism (Table II, column 2, 
75% quartile), as becomes clear when we look at the statistics for the individual 
items.21 46 percent of the interviewees reject the view that the Commission 
should become the government of the European Union, almost 23 percent 




























































































support the radical intergovemmentalist statement that member states should 
remain the central pillars, not the European Parliament or the European 
Commission (item 1). Furthermore, most top officials appear wary of further 
competencies for Brussels: 13 percent unconditionally support subsidiarity, and 
49 percent underwrite it with reservations (item 2). No doubt, this high level of 
support is partly conjunctural. Since the Maastricht referendums, popular 
resistance to further EU expansion has induced many political actors, including 
Commission officials, to embrace subsidiarity. However, the strong association 
of this item with the four other items on this dimension suggests that support 
for subsidiarity is rooted in more fundamental intergovernmental convictions. 
Even if the Maastricht “shock” were to ebb away, support for subsidiarity 
would not. Among the leadership of the most visible supranational institution, 
largely intergovernmental designs find considerable backing.
What are the key conceptual differences between Supranationalists and 
Intergovemmentalists?
Europe as End or Means. For a Supranationalist, the dominant issue in 
the European Union is the future of European integration. “I am not in the 
business of right-wing or left-wing policies. ...Whether we promote European 
integration is what counts. ... (Ideology] is the wrong axis. We are most divided 
on another axis: pro-integration or anti-integration.” (Official’s emphasis 058.) 
An Intergovemmentalist does not share this zest to build Europe: “For me, it is 
something realistic, concrete, and inevitable.” (Official 120.) A 
Supranationalist fears and fuels the debate between supranationalism and 
intergovemmentalism, while an Intergovemmentalist worries and waits for the 
constitutional storm to subside so that he can get on with the job. A 
Supranationalist rejoices talking about the Commission’s role in the EU; an 
Intergovemmentalist quickly turns to his policy dossier.
Activism or Mediation. A Supranationalist loves a good institutional 
fight, in which he invariably comes down on the Commission’s side: “I love 
everything having to do with defending the prerogatives of the Commission 
vis-à-vis Council and Parliament.” (Official 070.) An Intergovemmentalist 
finds such institutional tug of war a waste of time and energy: “I am interested 
in better policies - that is important. The part played by the Commission - minor 
problem.... Fighting for the Commission’s prerogatives is counterproductive 
and ridiculous.” (Official’s emphasis 120.) According to an 
Intergovemmentalist, the Commission should not confront member states but 
act as “an independent, balanced clearing house for ideas, a springboard for 
ideas.” When national governments overlook their partners’ interests and 




























































































ground: “You need a consolidated basis of consensus and, as it is written into 
the treaties, the Commission can and often does play this role.” (Official 217.)
Political Leader or Agent to National Principals. A Supranationalist is 
convinced that only the Commission’s political leadership can advance 
European integration. That makes the role of a Commission official so different 
from that of a civil servant in an international secretariat, or in the 
Commission’s intergovernmental alter ego, the Council Secretariat: “[A 
Commission official] is there to formulate European policies and to get fifteen 
member-states behind a certain policy line. The Council itself is incapable of 
doing the work. And our colleagues in the Council secretariat are not policy­
makers; they are [only] good for finalizing compromises; they are a secretariat. 
They do not have the mentality of coming up with policy proposals. As a 
Commission official, on the other hand, one has to learn very early on that there 
must be a political drive, and one must exchange views and then one has to 
decide. And this is what the people in the Council [Secretariat] never learn: to 
decide. Commission people have to decide. They have to say: ‘This is the line 1 
propose, and this is my price.’ Next, they have to go to the member states and 
r  fight for it.” (Official’s emphasis 182.) For an Intergovemmentalist, the 
^ political objectives should be set elsewhere: “I am an official servant of the 
European construction. I have tried to make Europe as relevant as 1 could in the 
various policy areas 1 have been responsible for. Yet I am convinced that this 
construction must remain very attentive to national sensitivities ...We know 
very well that the national states must maintain a very important place in the 
[European] construction.” (Official 027.)
Principles of Decision Making: Democrats versus Technocrats
Most Commission officials believe that the era of benevolent technocracy in the 
tradition of Jean Monnet has come to a close (Table II, column 3). Mean and 
median scores are well below the neutral point. The standard deviation is lower 
than for the three other dimensions, which indicates that there is broad 
agreement among top officials.
However, this consensus is not unequivocally in favor of a democratic 
polity. The litmus test for top officials concerns their attitude towards the 
European Parliament, key symbol of a democratic Europe. The item forces 
them to weigh their positional interests against their democratic conviction by 
asking whether the Commission should support the European Parliament’s bid 
for full legislative powers even if the price for the Commission would be to 
lose its monopoly of initiative (item 7). 36 percent of the sample think the 
Commission should, though less than 8 percent without reservations, while 61 




























































































make European policy making less effective. That is why opposition against 
trading the Commission’s initiative for greater parliamentary powers is so 
strongly associated with support for prior attention to the internal market and 
sound administrative management (items 6 and 5). However, when it comes to 
the crunch, only a small minority wants unconditional priority for these policy 
objectives - 11 percent for the internal market and 17 percent for sound 
management. Most officials are conflicted about the desirable balance of 
democratic principles and functional imperatives. What are the central bones of 
contention between Democrats and Technocrats?
Promote a Polity-in-the-Making or Build a Functional Organization. In 
the eyes of a Democrat, the Commission should first and foremost encourage 
Europeans to become citizens: “I believe that is our task: to make of subjects 
[sic] active members of the European Union. My role is to introduce the citizen 
in Europe.” (Official’s emphasis 070.) A Technocrat believes that the 
Commission’s role is to deliver good policy and to implement it efficiently. 
European integration can only be built on sound functional results: “Let us 
concentrate on the essential, first of all, which is making sure that [the internal 
market] operates properly. And if you can get it to operate properly, then you 
can demonstrate the superiority of a European solution, and new political 
perspectives may open up. [Unfortunately], the history of the Community over 
the last twenty years has been a fuite-en-avant.” (Official’s emphasis 016.) 
Opening up the policy process to public, parties and politicians should be done 
with due reticence.
Representative Democracy or Enlightened Elitism. A Democrat has a 
positive view of politics: “We officials stand on expertise and we think we are 
great, but the person who goes out and faces the electorate, is elected and 
defends [her voters’] views in a democratic process on a continuing basis 
deserves admiration. Where would democracy be without the people who are 
willing to face the choice of their fellow citizens? ... 1 love going to the 
[European] Parliament and exchanging views with parliamentarians.” (Official 
030.) A technocrat feels ambivalent about the political process, because 
political conflict greatly complicates expert-based problem solving. “[I would 
accept greater democratic input] provided you can do it in a way which retains 
the capacity to take important decisions effectively. The problem is that the 
institutional debate [about greater parliamentary powers] runs parallel to the 
substantive debate we try to engage in. We often get institutional results that, in 
the name of democracy, actually make it harder to achieve what the Community 




























































































Politics and Market: Political-Regulators versus Market-Liberals
European market integration entails the elimination of national barriers to trade 
and distortions of competition, and common policies to shape the conditions 
under which markets operate. However, from the start, the institutional set-up 
has privileged the former - market-liberalizing policies - over the latter - 
market-correcting regulation.22 While the latter requires legislation and thus 
political agreement among national governments, the basic principles of 
liberalization are laid down in the Treaties. They can be extended, without 
much political debate and under the guise of mere rule application or 
adjudication, by the European Court of Justice and the European Commission. 
The Commission, with strong competencies in competition policy, external 
trade and customs, has been highly instrumental in deepening the asymmetry 
between the market-making and market-correcting sides of the integration 
process.
Notwithstanding this powerful institutional bias, no interviewed 
Commission official is willing to support a Europe limited to a free trade zone. 
Very few would describe themselves as ardent market liberals. On the scale for 
Politics and Market, the distribution is heavily skewed in favor of political 
regulation. Mean and median scores are well above 3 (Table II, column four). 
More than one out of four officials score the maximum value of 4.
Most Commission officials strongly support political regulation of the 
integrated market. 47 percent give unconditional support to Delors’ project of 
European regulated capitalism, which entails an extensive welfare state, social 
dialogue between both sides of industry, a redistributive regional policy, and 
industrial policy (item 9). For 46 percent, extensive redistribution through 
cohesion policy deserves full support, and another 31 percent give qualified 
support (item 10). All in all, Commission officials as a group seem bent to the 
regulated capitalism end. And yet, within these parameters of a generally 
favorable attitude to European political regulation, there is real disagreement on 
how and how much Europe should regulate capitalism. One out of five officials 
distances himself from the majority view: 20 percent reject cohesion policy 
(item 10) while 2 percent abstain, 14 percent do not agree with Delors’ 
European societal model (item 9) and another 4.7 percent abstain or insist on a 
neutral position. So how does the Europe of a Political-Regulator differ from 
that of a Market-Liberal?
European Social Model or Liberal Market. Disagreements between 
Political-Regulators and Market-Liberals are rooted in distinct views of the 




























































































Europe: “I am proud that I have participated with Jacques Delors, as one of his 
lieutenants, in constructing a certain model for the European Union, where the 
values are solidarity, cohesion, local empowerment, empowering the citizen in 
regions and localities. ... This is not a free trade area, not simply the creation of 
a market for 400 million inhabitants ... We are defending a cultural model, 
neither the Japanese model nor the American model, but the social market 
economy, the Rhine model. And that idea is shared from the south of Spain to 
the north of Sweden.” (Official 025.) This is not the worldview of a Market- 
Liberal: “I have combated public interventionism, protectionism and 
overregulation. That has been my mission to date, that has been my ambition.” 
(Official 114.) A Market-Liberal fights Olsonian rent seeking and 
protectionism; only a liberalized market can provide the conditions for 
economic growth and greater welfare in Europe.
Center-left or Moderate-right. Behind these visions, one can discern left- 
right tensions concerning the relationship between state, market and society, 
but devoid of the polarization associated with traditional class politics. A 
Political-Regulator has strong doubts about the market as a self-correcting 
mechanism. The state, at whatever level, is indispensable to reduce benefits for 
winners and costs for losers: “We should operate in those parts of the European 
spatial economy that the market does not reach or that the market has let down. 
I would get into a wild argument with the rightwing about the market. Maybe 
the market would be so long coming [to save these deprived areas] that by the 
time it gets there, there won’t be any people left to save.” (Official 057.) For a 
Market-Liberal, priority is to stimulate growth through private initiative: “The 
benefits are in the greater market as such, and in the opportunities we can create 
[through a liberalized] market.” (Official 055.)
Few Political-Regulators discard market ideas, and they are 
uncomfortable with a language of class struggle. Rare is the official who 
criticizes the influence of big business. Only 28 percent do, and most of them 
only mutely (item 11), but a Political-Regulator is significantly more likely to 
do so than a Market-Liberal.23 Moderation too on the side of the Market- 
Liberal, who is reluctant to insulate market-making policies from social 
policies: “How can you take that view [separate economic liberalization from 
social policies]? The fact is that whatever you do has implications and 
repercussions in other areas." (Official 010.) Supporters of Thatcherite views 
on state and market are hard to find in the Commission. A Market-Liberal, 
commenting on the neoliberal preferences of the British conservative 
government in 1995, draws the line: ‘The UK government has a problem. The 
House [i.e. the Commission] continues to work as if that viewpoint did not 





























































































Political Mobilization or Exploiting Institutional Asymmetry. A 
Political-Regulator is political mobilizer by necessity. He fights against a 
liberal bias in the institutional set-up. So he mobilizes forces sympathetic to 
European regulated capitalism inside and outside European institutions. A 
Political-Regulator pays special attention to the European Parliament. Unlike a 
Democrat, who supports the institution as an integral component of a 
democratic polity, a Political-Regulator has pragmatic reasons to fight for 
greater parliamentary powers. The European Parliament has traditionally 
supported environmental regulation, redistribution and social policy. “We have 
the European Parliament that helps us a lot... [The European parliamentarians] 
are our objective allies, even though they are often not very comfortable allies.” 
(Official 047.) A Market-Liberal, on the other hand, is aware of his privileged 
position under current rules: “There is no question that the balance has changed 
[in the European Union], that there is much greater emphasis on creating 
greater opportunities [through liberalization] rather than giving out money [to 
support industries]. Some people are pushing more than others in that direction, 
and I am one of them.” (Official 010.) A Political-Regulator supports further 
powers for the European Parliament more readily than a Market-Liberal.24
Public Interest and Societal Input: Eurofonctionnaires versus Responsive 
Euroservants
Senior Commission officials have a difficult time balancing the European 
public good and national or functional demands. As a group, they emphasize 
mutual dependence between actors, and prefer decisions reached through 
persuasion rather than imposition or unilateral action. They are significantly 
closer to the responsiveness side of the scale: mean and median are well below 
2.5 (see Table II, column 5). For Responsive Euroservants, networking, 
partnership, and openness to a variety of views and forms of governance are 
essential.
However, there is considerable variation among officials, as evident from 
the relatively high standard deviation (.589, the highest of the four scales). One 
out of four Commission officials lean to a European civil service at arm’s 
length of stakeholder interests (Table II, column 5: 75% quartile). Given the 
central role of national governments in European decision making, Commission 
officials are particularly concerned about capture by national interests. More 
than 29 percent regret the influence of national considerations on colleagues’ 
judgment, 39 percent are wary of national influence on particular Commission 
services. Networking makes the Commission vulnerable to capture, and so 
mutual dependence could become Commission dependence. For a 




























































































key conceptual differences between the ideal Europe of a Eurofonctionnaire 
and that of a Responsive Euroservant?
s«̂ _ Identity. A genuine Eurofonctionnaire steps out of his nationality to 
become a-national: “It is of course wrong to say that one does not have 
anymore a passport, a nationality ... But it is also true that one should try to lose 
one’s national identity - no, not to lose it but to make abstraction of it. I have 
many links with [my country], but my thinking is not anymore like a 
[countryman].” (Official 080.) Out of the mélange of different national cultures 
a new identity emerges. The contrast is great with a Responsive Euroservant, 
who seeks to highlight the different components in the mélange: “I like my 
service to be a microcosm of the Community. I like my colleagues to reflect the 
diversity within the Community. ... There is some wonderment in that. There is 
a certain mystery as to how people with such different backgrounds can work 
together.” (Official 030.)
Commission Cohesion or Independent Mind. Creating the true European 
in spirit and mind is not sufficient for a Eurofonctionnaire. An official should 
give priority to the unity of the European civil service, not to his own ideas. “I 
find very often that people have their own agenda and they push it through 
regardless of what the Commission thinks. If the Commission wants to work as 
a whole, it should be much more coherent than it is now.” (Official’s emphasis 
055.) A Eurofonctionnaire is abhorred by the infighting in the Commission. Of 
all officials, 46 percent finds that current levels of infighting hurt the 
Commission’s legitimacy, but this perception is considerably stronger among 
Eurofonctionnaires where more than 70 percent subscribe to the statement 
against 27 percent of the Responsive Euroservants.25 For a Responsive 
Euroservant, on the other hand, the Commission is an arena where priorities can 
be pursued, not a purposeful actor in its own right with whom one should 
invariably identify. Unity and team spirit are not unconditional virtues. 
Innovation comes from small groups of creative people, who are usually 
Commission insiders but they may also be drawn from outside. “If you put 
together a few people who are visionnaire, a Commissioner, a head of unit, or 
director ..., you can get things done.” (Official 022.)
Making or Taking Cues. A Eurofonctionnaire does not simply act upon 
requests, but is in the business of identifying priorities from a European 
vantage point. “What is relevant is the image one has about oneself, and about 
the policy one is making. That is where a Commissioner and a director general 
must lead, and you can give the staff the opportunity to collaborate in that. That 
is what public interest is. Outside influences do not weigh [very much].” 
(Official 058.) A Responsive Euroservant finds it hard to believe in a separate 





























































































How are top Commission officials oriented to basic issues of governance in the 
European Union? How do they think about the organization of political 
authority in Europe, the scope of European authoritative regulation in the 
economy, and the role of national and societal interests in European decision 
making?
In this paper I attempt to shed light on these questions both quantitatively 
and qualitatively. In a factor analysis of 106 officials’ responses to items 
measuring political orientations, four dimensions capture almost half of the 
variation. These dimensions correspond to coherent images of Europe as 
articulated by the same Commission officials during in-depth interviews. First, 
should the European Union be supranational - with powerful, autonomous 
supranational institutions like the Commission, the European Parliament and 
the European Court of Justice - or intergovernmental - with authority primarily 
vested in the member states? As a group, top Commission officials are slightly 
bent to supranationalism, but one out of four supports an intergovernmental 
design. For a Supranationalist, the pursuit of deeper European integration - “an 
ever closer political union” - is the prime objective, and he believes that 
political leadership in this venture should come from the Commission. An 
Intergovemmentalist perceives European integration as a means to reduce 
transaction costs for international cooperation, where the Commission’s role is 
to mediate among member state interests. Second, should decision making be 
technocratic - as in most international organizations and as during much of the 
European Union’s history - or democratic - as in the European national states? 
Half seeks to keep democratic principles and functional-technocratic 
imperatives in balance. Yet one quarter clearly prefers more democracy - even 
at the expense of the Commission’s unique powers of legislative initiative. And 
another quarter defends technocratic principles for fear that greater democracy 
would make European policy making less effective. A Democrat believes that 
the European Union is a polity-in-the-making, where choices should be subject 
to political debate and the Commission should promote politicization. For a 
Technocrat, European integration can only be built on sound functional results; 
introducing cooperation problems into the world of politicians, parliaments and 
public greatly complicates rational, expert-based problem solving. Thirdly, to 
what extent should market activity be regulated at the European level? 
Commission officials overwhelmingly prefer regulated capitalism to unfettered 
capitalism. However, at least 20 percent oppose the majority view. Political- 
Regulators and Market-Liberals alike eschew radicalism, with the former 




























































































refraining from Thatcherite neoliberalism. While a Political-Regulator seeks to 
strengthen European authority to craft a unique social model for Europe in- 
between the Japanese and the American way, a Market-Liberal wants to 
reinforce selective supranational surveillance of the liberalized market in order 
to eliminate protectionism inside the Union and towards third countries. 
Finally, how should top Commission officials balance the European public 
good with national and functional interests? As a group. Commission officials 
are most comfortable with an approach that emphasizes responsiveness to 
major stakeholders in European policies. However, there is considerable 
variation - more so than on previous dimensions. Though very few ardently 
advocate primacy for the European public interest, about one quarter gives it 
more weight than the interests of stakeholders. European identity, unity and 
team spirit in the Commission, and a calling to lead are for a Eurofonctionnaire 
the building blocks of a European public function. Respect for Europe’s 
diversity, the Commission as a privileged arena for action rather than a unitary 
actor, and a calling to be responsive are central principles for a Responsive 
Euroservant.
Top Commission officials have divergent orientations to European 
governance. These divisions appear similar to those that run through parties, 
governments and citizens in Europe, though we lack comparative data to 
evaluate this premise systematically. On a practical level, these findings call 
into question popular beliefs about the Commission bureaucracy as single- 
mindedly pro-integration, unreceptive to calls for greater democracy, motivated 
by its own ideological agenda (portrayed by some as socialist, and by others as 
neoliberal), and giving priority to an abstract European interest.
The results raise conceptual questions about the EU institutional setting 
within which Commission officials operate. First, they cast doubt on EU studies 
that conceive of the Commission as a unitary actor. The Commission is not 
capable of prescribing officials’ orientations. Fifty years after its creation, the 
Commission does not have powerful mechanisms for selective recruitment, 
socialization or cognitive association that may produce a more unitary 
“mindset”.26 Secondly, the fact that career officials harbor sharply delineated, 
opposing images of Europe - not simply vague or inchoate clusters of beliefs - 
is consistent with claims that European integration has become a conscious 
political struggle between explicit, contending projects for institutional reform 
of the European Union. Top Commission officials participate in the 
politicization of European decision making. Thirdly, to the extent that 
contention among Commission officials reflects divisions among political 
actors in Europe, they appear less aloof from public debate than often assumed. 




























































































a particularly porously bounded institution, into which officials are to some 
extent able to import and advocate their own interests and ideas.
So how do they come to think the way they do? What makes some 
officials support supranationalism and others intergovemmentalism? Why do 
some want more democratic decision making in the European Union, while 
others defend technocratic principles? Why are there so few market-liberals? 
Mapping and categorizing how top Commission officials think about Europe’s 
future is a necessary, but insufficient step to answer these questions. To 
understand the sources of variation we need to examine carefully how interests 
and ideas from their current environment and past experiences affect their 
views on Europe’s future. That requires systematic causal analysis.37 In this 
article, I seek to clear the path for such research.
Senior Commission officials interpret, live and help reshaping European 
governance day by day. Rather than being insulated, they are aware of the 
fundamental issues that divide Europe’s parties, public, and governments. They 
are active participants in these debates.
Liesbet HOOGHE 
University of Toronto 
Department of Political Science 
100 St.George Street 
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Appendix -  Indicators for Factor Analysis
1. The member states, not the Commission nor the European Parliament, ought to remain 
the central pillars of the European Union.
2. The strength of Europe lies not in more power for Brussels, but in effective government at 
the lowest possible level.
3. It is imperative that the European Commission become the true government of the 
European Union.
4. The Commission acts too much as an administration, and not enough as the government 
of Europe.
5. The Commission should concentrate on administering things efficiently.
6. The Commission should concentrate on maintaining the internal market.
7. The Commission should support the European Parliament’s bid for full legislative 
powers, even if the price would be to lose its monopoly of initiative.
8. Europe should be more than a common market.
9. Europe has developed a unique model of society, and the Commission should help to 
preserve it: extensive social services, civilized industrial relations, negotiated transfers 
among groups to sustain solidarity, and steer economic activity for the general welfare.
10. No united Europe without a mature European cohesion policy.
11. European Union policy is too much influenced by big business.
12. The Commission cannot function properly without a vision, a set of great priorities, a 
blueprint for the future.
13. Pressure groups and special interests, like trade unions, farmers organizations, industry, 
environmental lobbyists, and so on, disturb the proper working of European government.
14. The egoistic behavior of some member states threatens the very survival of the European 
project.
15. The best advice on a proposed policy usually comes from the interests directly affected.
16. Too many Commission civil servants let their nationality interfere in their professional 
judgments.
17. It hurts the Commission’s legitimacy that certain DGs tend to be dominated by particular 
nationalities, such as agriculture by the French, competition by the Germans, regional 
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